Epstein Files, Nuclear Threats & the Ukraine War: Why the West Refuses to Win

The West can be on the right side – but only if it actually wins. Virtue without victory is just expensive theater

As of December 21, 2025, the Russo-Ukrainian war enters its fourth winter amid intense diplomatic activity. In Miami, Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev met with U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, describing the talks on a U.S.-proposed peace plan as “constructive” and set to continue.

However, back in Moscow, President Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov sent conflicting signals, dismissing European and Ukrainian amendments as unhelpful and denying serious discussion of trilateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks. Meanwhile, Putin has signaled openness to direct dialogue with French President Emmanuel Macron, welcomed by the Élysée Palace. These mixed messages underscore the challenges in ending a conflict where Russia has suffered over a million casualties and trillions in losses, yet Western narratives often portray Moscow as inexorably advancing.

This is not a battlefield reality. It is a narrative failure: the war is far more winnable for Ukraine than most Western capitals admit. The biggest obstacles are not on the front line, but in Western psychology, politics, and strategic imagination.

The Psychological Traps

• Hope is not a strategy Biden’s slogan “As long as it takes” had no endgame. Victory was almost never mentioned. Washington seemed to hope both sides would eventually tire and reach some vague deal. “As long as it takes” was never a strategy.

• Russia’s nuclear threats worked – but the real fear may have been personal In autumn 2022, Moscow shifted the Western frame from winning a conventional war to avoiding nuclear war. U.S. war-gaming assumptions made leaders see escalation as inevitable, paralyzing decisions at the critical moment. Yet reports suggest the administration’s priorities lay elsewhere: the DOJ quietly pull photos of President Trump and his his friends from the newly released Epstein tranche after reporters viewed them live on Friday, hinting that personal and political sensitivities may have outweighed strategic concerns.

• The aid was tiny and overvalued Much of the celebrated Western assistance consisted of 20-year-old Humvees and soon-to-be-retired HIMARS systems. Valued at replacement cost for domestic accounting, Ukraine received only 20–30% of the headline figures in real military value. The entire effort was a rounding error in U.S. defense spending.

The Strategic Reality

• Nuclear proliferation is the long-term price of Western caution If a nuclear-armed Russia defeats or stalemates a non-nuclear Ukraine, dozens of states will conclude nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Poland, and others have the technical capacity to move quickly. China understands this; that’s why Xi forced Putin to include a “no nuclear use” clause in their 2023 joint statement.

• Current U.S. policy prioritizes Russia over Ukraine – and blurs personal gain with national interest Unlike the late Biden years – when talk of victory and asset confiscation became mainstream – current leadership appears to value stable relations with Russia more than Ukraine’s long-term security. There is little evidence they distinguish between personal enrichment (for themselves and their circle, such as money made by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner) and broader American national interests. The American economy and national security seem secondary to private deals and flattery.

• Putin does not care about money the way we do Western negotiators assume everyone wants profit. Putin’s obsession is power. In his mind, control over Ukraine is what makes Russia a great power rather than a diminished regional actor. Offering money or sanctions relief will not buy peace; it will only fund the next war.

• Ukraine’s fate still shapes Central Europe Historians have long understood that whoever controls the territory between Russia and the rest of Europe holds the key to the continent’s security. Putin knows this. Many Western capitals appear not to.

The Battlefield Reality

• Russia has already lost catastrophically More than one million casualties (Western estimates: 1.1–1.2 million killed or severely wounded), trillions in destroyed or wasted wealth, and only a few percent of Ukrainian territory gained after nearly four years. The front line is largely frozen. Neither side can concentrate large forces without being detected and destroyed by drones and precision strikes.

Ukraine is now striking deep into Russian territory: sinking ships in the Black Sea, hitting oil refineries, disrupting the shadow fleet. Kyiv believes it has finally learned how to inflict serious strategic damage if it receives consistent support. The Ukrainians are not asking for miracles; they are asking for the tools they have already proven they can use effectively.

A bad ceasefire is possible – but only if Europe and America force Ukraine to accept one. If Western capitals continue to buy the narrative of Russian invincibility, that outcome becomes more likely. If they recognize Ukraine’s growing ability to degrade Russia’s war machine, a far better settlement remains within reach.

The war can still end on terms that strengthen deterrence, limit nuclear proliferation, and preserve a free Ukraine. Whether it does depends less on battlefield realities than on whether the West can escape the psychological traps.